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# **The Influence of Non-Spousal Owned Housing on Marital Power and Marital Satisfaction: Gender Differences in Taiwan**

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This study discusses the role of housing in marital life within the context of the patriarchal norms of Taiwan and analyzes the effect of housing tenure on marital power, as well as gender-specific housing expectations in terms of marital satisfaction. It is found that, in addition to directly affecting marital power, housing tenure not only can moderate the relationships between family structure and marital power and between marital power and marital satisfaction, but also marital satisfaction through the mediating effect of marital power. The gender-specific effect of housing tenure cannot be completely explained by the resource theory; hence, gender roles and changing gender consciousness must be considered in modifications of this theory. For women, housing tenure is strongly associated with family structure and marital power, and may even change the direct effect of family structure on marital power, which explains for their preference for housing within the context of patrilocal cohabitation. The study also identifies gender-specific housing expectations in terms of marital satisfaction, which may be due to the fact that husbands try to strengthen their gender and class and wives realize their preference for equal rights through housing tenure. These findings provide insights into the role of housing tenure in marital life, thus informing the formulation of housing policy.

### **Keywords**

Patriarchal norms, Patrilocal cohabitation, Housing tenure, Resource theory, Gender role

## 1. Introduction

Homeownership is commonly seen as a prerequisite for good financial status in marriage and carries a symbolic meaning in demonstrating "success" and a "middle-class status" (Cherlin, 2004). It can also be seen as a "commitment" to a future conjugal relationship, and its wealth accumulation effect can improve the financial capacity of a couple, thus facilitating subsequent marriage and birth behaviors (Morgan and King, 2001; Sweeney, 2002; Lauster, 2008). Therefore, housing tenure arises mostly when the family status is stable, because housing purchase may be the largest financial investment throughout one's life. For those who have not yet achieved stable family status, a housing purchase may be quite risky. Single individuals are the least likely to own housing, and a marital relationship is considered more stable than a single status, and more committed to each other than a cohabitation relationship, thus increasing the demand for suitable housing (Feijten and Mulder, 2002).

Functionally, housing is a space for living, and a place for emotional interaction among the occupants. In addition to its use function, housing tenure can enhance one's sense of stability, belonging and autonomy, thus improving quality of life and subjective well-being (André et al., 2019; Mo et al., 2023). Moreover, it is a symbol of financial status and capacity, and an alternative choice in satisfying one's living needs. For unmarried people, the connection between marriage and housing is based on functional considerations, including the perception of marital life with housing, as well as a response to gender roles and overall socio-economic environment (Lin and Hsu, 2023). For married people, however, there is the question of the role that housing plays in marital life. This study is motivated by the mentality in Chinese society that "housing is indispensable for marriage" and the implication that housing can improve marital satisfaction.

In marital life, housing is regarded as the place of the "family" because its resource and gender characteristics involve the use of marital power, such as family decision-making and housework division. From family to kinship, the intergenerational flow of resources and overlapping family roles make the use of marital power more complex and are common occurrences in Chinese marriages. This study evaluates how "parent-owned" housing instead of "self-owned" housing changes the use of marital power, in addition to whether the parental provision of housing strengthens the marital power of the married couple according to the resource theory. Gender differences must also be considered in the cultural context, highlighted by the normative resource theory.

In Chinese society, the mentality that "housing is indispensable for marriage" implies that one must wait until one is a homeowner before marrying (Mulder and Wagner, 2001). This discourages young people from marriage in the presence of high housing prices. However, is a marriage backed by housing happier than living in non-spousal owned housing? Hence, this study further

examines the correlation between residential housing tenure and marital satisfaction, or specifically, whether housing tenure moderates the effect of marital power on marital satisfaction or affects marital satisfaction through the mediating effect of marital power.

In summary, housing is more than the space that people live in. Housing in a marital relationship may involve marital power, gender roles, and marital satisfaction, and a Chinese-style marital relationship involves the intergenerational transfer of resources. Previous studies on the relationship between housing and marriage have focused on the considerations in and chronological order of family decisions (Feijten and Mulder, 2002), and find that decision-makers predominantly make pro-active decisions based on their perception of the functionality of housing. However, the role of housing in actual marital life is rarely discussed. This study discusses the relationships among housing, marital power, and gender roles in marital life within the context of the patriarchal norms of Taiwan (e.g., patriarchal family system and patrilocal cohabitation). This study is not only of great value to Chinese society which has the mentality that "housing is indispensable for marriage", but also provides a family perspective to investigate the effect of housing tenure on marital power and the subjective perception of marital life within a cultural context, thus serving as a reference for policy formulation.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Chinese Family System**

Patriarchy is dominant in the family system in Taiwan, following the cultural tradition of the Chinese family system which maintains paternal lineages and patrilocal cohabitation. Patriarchal society grants men a superior position in different aspects (e.g., filial duty, marriage, heirship, and conjugal power structure), and special status and privileges in families and the labor market (Miller, 2017; Connor et al., 2017).

A patriarchal family structure places specific expectations on men and allocates family resources accordingly. The intergenerational contract proposes that there is a contractual relationship between parents and children, in which parents invest in their children based on an expected return from them; namely, parents allocate unequal family resources to children on a self-interested basis. In a patriarchal society, more family resources are allocated to sons, who are expected to return more rewards. For example, more resources are often invested in the education of sons, who are expected to attain high-salaried jobs in the labor market. Additionally, family property is inherited by sons, and married sons (especially the eldest) are expected to live with their parents or take care of them (Lin et al., 2003; Lu, 2017). The gender inequality in the allocation of family resources also serves to consolidate a patriarchal gender

hierarchy, for example, providing or assisting sons with housing rather than daughters.

However, the patrilocal habitation in the patriarchal culture has evolved toward a core family structure. Demographic changes (e.g., low fertility rate), higher personal education, more economic resources, and social welfare have all discouraged intergenerational cohabitation and contributed to the emergence of core families (Yang and Dong, 2007). In 2021, core families accounted for 33.02% of all families in Taiwan, conjugal families for 20.33%, and three-generation cohabitation families for 11.65% (DGBAS, 2022a). Although filial norms still greatly influence intergenerational cohabitation (Lu and Cheng, 2012), pragmatic economic considerations are the key factor that motivates adult sons to cohabit with their parents (Takagi and Silverstein, 2006; Yang and Dong, 2007).

The decline of patrilocal habitation does not imply that patriarchal values and norms in family life have been shaken; they continue to exert great influence, as evidenced by the gender division of housework, gender differences in the allocation of family resources, and the practice of filial piety that favors the sons. The "neolocal residence" pattern in core families has resulted in men entering into the "propertied class" through housing consumption, thereby consolidating their family position as the head of family (Madigan et al., 1990; Fincher, 2016).

This study investigates the interaction between housing tenure and patriarchal norms and argues that within the context of the family culture, the influence of housing tenure on marital power differs between men and women, thus proving the gendered role of housing in marital life. Moreover, this study argues that gender difference in housing expectation may be reflected in marital satisfaction.

## **2.2 Housing Tenure and Marital Power**

Marital power refers to the ability of one spouse to impose their will or preference on the other in the process of marital interaction (Straus and Yodanis, 1995), and is an important factor that affects the quality of marriage. Their specific connotation includes relative and relational dependence. The resource theory suggests that marital power is determined by the relative resources of the spouse, such as education, income, professional prestige, knowledge, skills, and rewards; whoever has more relative resources has more power in the relationship. However, the social exchange theory emphasizes the exchange values of resources: through resource exchange, one is able to receive satisfaction outside the marriage (e.g., social status and social participation), and less dependent on the marital relationship (i.e., the independence hypothesis), and thus has more marital power. Conversely, a spouse with a low

exchange value of resources is more dependent on the marital relationship and has less marital power.

"Housework division" and "family decision-making" (doing and deciding) are usually used to measure marital power (Sassler and Miller, 2011). Those with more resources have more decision-making power and less involvement in housework during marital interaction (Loving et al., 2004; Davis and Greenstein, 2013). Housing tenure is considered a resource possession since individuals typically require financial means such as savings, installment loans, or parental assistance to acquire a house. Therefore, homeownership is often seen as an indicator of resource ownership and power.

Due to real estate registration, financial loans, and taxation systems, it is difficult to determine the resources that couples have allocated to homeownership, or the extent of the financial assistance from parents. Due to mutual trust and financial sharing in marital life, it is common in Taiwan for couples to share or donate real estate to each other while one spouse who is eligible for a favorable housing loan is registered as the homeowner. This complicates the discussion on the relationship between housing tenure and marital power. Focusing on housing tenure other than "self-owned" housing (e.g., "parent-owned" housing and "landlord-owned" housing), this study examines the effect of housing resources on the marital power of husbands and wives. According to the resource and social exchange theories, housing resources from the parents of a spouse may change the relative and absolute resources of a couple, or reduce independence in the marital relationship (e.g., post-divorce residence, and use of marital power) according to the independence hypothesis.

In addition to relative resources, the power norms of spouses in a particular culture or sub-culture should be considered in determining the level of marital power between spouses. This is the theory of resources within a cultural context, wherein the differences in marital power between spouses are explained on a sociocultural basis, thus emphasizing the identification of specific power-holders under cultural norms. In other words, the relativity and relational dependence of resources are culturally based to influence the processes and outcomes of marital power use. The normative resource theory argues that gender norms can change the influence of resources on marital power, which indicates that resources and the resource exchange theory are only applicable in cases of equality between men and women. Patriarchal societies strengthen the access of men to resources through the consolidation of gender hierarchies, with gender as the basis of power. Moreover, kinships assist men in building a gender hierarchy under patriarchal norms in marital life, which makes housing gender specific. Substantial economic resources from the families of origin can moderate the marital power of couples (Lee and Tang, 2016). Hence, this study infers that, under the patriarchal norms in Taiwan, the provision of housing resources by the parents of the husband may increase their marital power, whereas "landlord-owned" housing may reduce the marital power of husbands.

Moreover, patriarchal norms are also manifested in patrilocal cohabitation. Patrilocal residence enables husbands to obtain organizational or emotional resources (Warner et al., 1986; Lu, 2000) from their families of origin, thus increasing the spousal gap in relative resources.<sup>1</sup> Conversely, the marital power of wives may be reduced by patrilocal residence because social norms expect sons to perform various filial duties, but in reality, the wives perform daily or routine housework. In Taiwan, the extended family structure has a negative effect on the participation of husbands in housework, and the monitoring function of gender norms by the older generations in extended families may allow traditional gender norms to be reproduced and sustained (Lu and Yi, 2005). In core families, however, decisions are more likely to be made by husbands and wives equally (Xu and Lai, 2002).

Housing can consolidate the gender class of husbands. Hence, this study infers that when housing is owned by the parents-in-law, patrilocal residence can reduce the marital power of a wife more significantly. In short, gender norms and patrilocal cohabitation in a patriarchal context render housing in marital life highly gender-specific, (specifically, the effect of housing tenure), and may interact with family structure to change the use of marital power.

### **2.3 Housing Tenure, Marital Power, and Marital Satisfaction**

Marital satisfaction, which is used to measure the quality of a marriage, refers to the overall subjective feelings derived from expectations for the marital relationship (Wu and Yi, 2003). According to both the social exchange and equity theories, individuals have a high degree of satisfaction when they perceive that their relationship has met or exceeded their own standards for a “good relationship”, or when they perceive increased feedback from the environment that the relationship is fair (Kamo, 1993). Therefore, marital satisfaction can be defined as the attitude an individual has toward his or her own marital relationship, which are the subjective feelings about the marital relationship that is influenced by internal personal characteristics and external environmental responses.

From the perspective of social exchange and interaction, the factors that influence marital satisfaction can be categorized as personal characteristics and conjugal relations. The former refers to gender, age, personality traits, and employment status, and the latter refers to the degree of compatibility between spouses, including social similarities—such as religious beliefs, ethnicity, or education—length of marriage, and relationship properties formed through spousal interaction. Compared with the personal characteristics or the degree of compatibility between spouses, interactions and relationship patterns are more

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<sup>1</sup> Cohabiting family members are a type of organizational resource, and cohabitation with the members of the families of origin can bring about a resource advantage (Warner et al., 1986).

directly influenced by subjective feelings, such as the distribution of power, management of conflict, and sense of fairness between giving and receiving (Crawford et al., 2004; Schneewind and Gerhard, 2005). As a mode of spousal interaction, marital power affects marital stability and the subjective perception of the spouse of marital life.

Like marital power, marital satisfaction is based on cultural norms; when behaviors are considered to be "non-traditional", or contrary to social expectations, they may cause internal family tensions and external norm deviations, thus reducing the marital satisfaction of one of the spouses. In Taiwan, cohabiting with the family of one's wife may be considered a deviation from the norm. When such cohabitation is beneficial to the family members of the wife rather than those of her husband, the couple may be subjected to social sanctions from his relatives (Lin and Yi, 2013). In Western cultures, couples with an attitude of gender equality tend to have a better marital relationship, whereas the marital satisfaction of wives in East Asia is relatively low (Qian and Sayer, 2016). Therefore, marital satisfaction is measured in terms of compliance with the patriarchal expectations of marital power, rather than the intensity of marital power.

Individuals who are more involved in housework compared to their spouse have less power in the home (Loving et al., 2004; Davis and Greenstein, 2013) and thus less marital satisfaction (O'Meara and Campbell, 2011; Lee and Tang, 2016). However, considering the strong implications of a socially expected gendered division of housework, studies on "perceptions of housework fairness" have found that even though women perform more housework than their husband, they still perceive that the housework division is fair (Tai and Baxter, 2018). In this regard, housewives who have less marital power in the division of housework may not have negative feelings about marital life.

Those who have more resources hold the power in family decision-making, which contributes to their marital satisfaction. However, Lee and Tang (2016) find that women who have more decision-making power in the family may reduce the likelihood of having a spouse who manages the household finances, thus leading to lower marital satisfaction for women. This may mean that the correlation between the control of women over decision-making and happiness is not straightforward (Li, 2021), as traditional attitudes and self-esteem play significant roles.

In a patriarchal context, gender differences in housing expectations may also be reflected in marital satisfaction. Patriarchal norms also affect the pattern of "upward supply" from adult children to their parents, which is regarded as a filial piety practice of gratitude to the parents. In East Asia, intergenerational financial support is predominantly unidirectional (i.e., children give more financial support to their parents than they receive), whereas housework support is predominantly bidirectional, with relatively slight intergenerational differences (Lin and Yi, 2013). Unless adult children encounter financial

difficulties or crises, parents rarely provide them with financial support; parental financial support is considered a deviation of the expectations of their children (Yi and Chang, 2020), and may have a negative effect on marital satisfaction. Rather than being a symbol of increased male power, financial support from the families of origin symbolizes a deficiency in self-ability, and is inconsistent with patriarchal norms that emphasize men as the head of the family. More resources from the families of origin result in more men dissatisfied with their marriage (Lee and Tang, 2016).

However, the modified resource theory (Rodman, 1972) argues that patriarchal norms vary significantly within cultural contexts at different stages of social development, as manifested in the gender hierarchy and its norms. Rodman (1972) argues that in a society that is progressing toward gender equality, the flexibility of social norms makes it possible to transform spousal resources into bargaining power, thus affecting the gender power of a family. Although the contribution of a wife to economic resources produces a bargaining power that affects marital power, gender norms at different levels of social structure mediate and inhibit the transformation of her economic resources into power, thus resulting in differences in the bargaining of spousal resources (Hammond and Overall, 2017; Cohn and Blumberg, 2019). Moreover, an egalitarian gender consciousness interacts with patriarchal norms through educational or socioeconomic status. In Taiwan, a large proportion of husbands with high socioeconomic status share the housework with their wife (Lu and Yi, 2005), although their wife still performs the majority of daily housework. Therefore, the discussion of marital satisfaction should not be limited to the interaction between resources and patriarchal norms but must also consider the ongoing influence of cultural norms. The role of housing resources may be transformed to increase the flexibility of the bargaining power of a couple, and moderate the relationship between marital power and satisfaction, thus facilitating the expected changes in the gender norms in contemporary society, reducing conflicts and responses, and positively affecting marital satisfaction.

## **2.4 Housing Market in Taiwan**

The motivation to form a family and towards housing tenure is related to the rental market system, and social awareness of homeownership (Scanlon et al., 2014). In countries with a high homeownership rate, the correlation between marriage and housing is high (Mulder, 2006; Bayrakdar et al., 2019), thus making marriage and homeownership joint decisions (Mok, 2005). The homeownership rate was high in Taiwan at 82.46% in 2020 (DGBAS, 2022b), the prevalence of a traditional value that associates land with wealth. In the past, the housing policy in Taiwan primarily focused on promoting homeownership, while the development of the rental market was neglected. The policies enhanced the ideological concept of “hierarchy of tenure”, where homeownership is regarded as a sign of social success, and those in rental housing are stigmatized (Rowland and Gurney, 2000).



With political liberalization, diversified financing channels, and rapid capital flows, the real estate market in Taiwan has experienced numerous booms since the 1970s. The commercialization of houses became an investment target as income growth did not keep pace with rising house prices. Since then, the affordability of housing for young people living in metropolitan areas has been decreasing. As of 2021, there is a house Price to Income Ratio (PIR) of 9.23 and a loan affordability ratio of 36.89% (Ministry of the Interior, 2022). Young people are ambivalent, stressed, and nervous about the traditional value of house ownership. While they desire to reproduce social norms through homeownership, they are aware that they have insufficient resources to enter an expensive housing market (McKee et al., 2017). Diminishing housing affordability has increased the dependence of adult children on parental support, which influences the homeownership of young adults (Smits and Mulder, 2008; Mulder et al., 2015; Dewilde et al., 2018).

### 3. Method

#### 3.1 Data and Sample

This study examines the role of housing in marital life and analyzes its influence on the marital power and satisfaction of husbands and wives. The respondents in the sample are all married (i.e., not single, cohabitating, separated, widowed, or divorced). The sample data are cited from the Panel Study of Family Dynamics (PSFD) by Academia Sinica in 2018.<sup>2</sup> The sample comprises 2,687 respondents (including 1,368 and 1,319 male and female respondents, respectively), who are born between 1935 and 1992 and range from 26 to 83 years old.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The PSFD study in Taiwan included adults aged 25 or older. The sampling process involved the use of the household-registered population as the sampling inventory, with stratified multi-stage sampling. Villages, townships, and urban areas were stratified based on urbanization levels, and respondents were selected by using probability proportional to size (PPS) through systematic sampling. Additionally, children aged 25 or older of the main sample were also included. For more information about the PSFD, please visit [http://psfd.sinica.edu.tw/web/plan\\_02.htm](http://psfd.sinica.edu.tw/web/plan_02.htm).

<sup>3</sup> The respondents included the main sample from the first survey in 2018 and those who were previously surveyed and tracked. Marital satisfaction was introduced as a survey topic for the first time in 2018. Since the PSFD is a long-term tracking survey, we could not directly observe the changes in marital power and satisfaction following a change in housing tenure. Instead, we used cross-sectional data to analyze the impact of housing tenure on marital power and satisfaction. The respondents also included the children of the main sample who are 25 and older. However, due to health issues, deaths, and lost contact, some of the participants are missing from the panel data. Therefore, the sample cannot be compared with the demographic census results.

### 3.2 Variables

In this study, the focus of discussion is the role of housing in marital life. In the empirical model, the major independent variable is housing tenure, while the dependent variables include marital power and marital satisfaction.

*Housing Tenure* refers to the tenure of the housing in which the respondent lived during the PSFD in 2018, or after the most recent move. Due to the question constraint, it could not be established whether the husbands or wives are the homeowners. In fact, co-ownership of housing by spouses is very common in Taiwan. Therefore, the variable value can be “self-owned”, “parent-owned”, “in-laws-owned”, or “landlord-owned”.<sup>4</sup> This study discusses the possible differentiated effect of “self-owned” housing on the marital power and marital satisfaction of men and women.

*Marital Power* is measured in terms of “doing and deciding” as specified in previous studies. *Power of Family Decision-Making* refers to the decision-making power of the respondent in family affairs, including the distribution of household expenditure, savings, investment and insurance, and purchase of high-priced consumer goods. A score of 2 is given when the decision-maker is “myself”. If the “couple” is the decision-maker, the score is 1. When the decision-maker is “others (including the spouse, parents, or parents-in-law)” the score is 0. The scores are then summated to obtain the following results: “more” (at least 3), “equal” (3), and “less” (less than 3). *Power of Housework Division* refers to the relative average weekly hours spent on housework by each spouse. It can be categorized as “more” (when housework time is less than 90% of that of spouse), equal (when the difference in housework time between the spouses is within 10%), or less (when housework time exceeds 110% of that of spouse).

*Marital Satisfaction* refers to the subjective perception of overall marital life, and is measured through a single question “are you overall satisfied with your marital life?” Very few respondents selected “very dissatisfied”, so “dissatisfied” and “very dissatisfied” were merged into a single response. Hence, there were three final options: “very satisfied”, “satisfied” and “dissatisfied”.

The models in this study are constructed with marital power and satisfaction as the dependent variables, and housing tenure as the independent variable. Other independent and control variables are described below.

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<sup>4</sup> Eight types of housing tenure (“rented (including student dormitories)”, “borrowed”, “dormitories in governments, companies or factories”, “living in military dependent villages”, “owned by children”, “owned by children’s spouses”, “owned by other relatives”, and “miscellaneous”) were combined into a single category of “landlord-owned” based on the survey questions.

## (1) Marital power model

*Family Structure* refers to the “neolocal residence” (in which a couple cohabits alone, with no parents or in-laws), “patrilocal residence” (where cohabitants include the father and/or mother of the husband), or “matrilocal residence” (where cohabitants include the father and/or mother of the wife).

*Couple Resource* refers to the relative age and income of a couple. *Relative age* is a continuous variable, which refers to the age of the respondent minus the age of his/her spouse. *Relative income* is a dummy variable, which refers to the relative average monthly gross income (including salary, bonus, overtime pay, year-end bonus, business income, and self-employment income, but excluding part-time income). It is categorized into two groups: when one's own income is greater than or equal to the income of their spouse, and when one's own income is less than that of their spouse or both spouses have no income.

Control variables include *Child*, *City*, and *Birth Cohort*, all of which are dummy variables. *Child* is divided into two categories: having one child or more, and having no child. *City* is categorized into two groups, which take into account the urban housing burden and generational change in gender values: living in the city (including Taipei, New Taipei, and Taichung), and residing in other areas. *Birth Cohort* is classified into three groups: after 1980, 1970 to 1979, and before 1969.

## (2) Marital satisfaction model

The independent variables include Housing Tenure, Family Structure, and Marital Power, as well as the following independent variables: conjugal relation, sharing frequency, and conflict coping.

*Conjugal relation* was derived from the self-reported ratings on the goodwill between spouses, where the response categories ranged from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). *Sharing frequency* was derived from the frequency of sharing thoughts or concerns between spouses, in which the response categories are “frequently”, “always”, “sometimes”, “seldom”, and “never” (score from 5 to 1). The scores assigned to the responses were added together to measure the frequency of two-way spouse-sharing, where higher scores indicated higher levels of sharing between both husband and wife. Similarly, *Conflict coping* was measured by summing the scores of the conflict coping behaviors of the couple. However, in this case, a higher score indicates a poorer conflict coping situation.

The control variables include *Child* and *City* (variable processing is described above). *Length of Marriage* is how long someone has been married until the time of the survey. Studies in Western countries have generally found a U-shaped relationship between the length of marriage and marital satisfaction. Marital satisfaction tends to be higher in the early and later stages of marriage

but reaches its lowest point during the child-rearing stage. However, VanLaningham et al. (2001) argue that the U-shaped pattern observed in cross-sectional research is not accurate and instead find a significantly negative effect of marital duration on marital happiness. In the context of Taiwan, empirical studies have not yet reached a consensus on this matter. *Household Income* was derived from the average monthly income, including salary, overtime pay, dividends, commissions, three-section bonus, year-end bonus, and part-time income. The response categories ranged between less than NT\$ 499,999, NT\$ 100,000–149,999, and NT\$ 150,000<sup>5</sup> or more. Existing studies on the impact of household income on marital quality show inconsistent findings. Jackson et al. (2017) find no significant effect, while Hardie et al. (2014) suggest lower marital quality in economically disadvantaged families and Yu and Chen (2020) find that higher family income positively affects the family satisfaction of women.

### 3.3 Analytic Strategy

In this study, the sample is first analyzed descriptively, and a gender difference test is conducted. A correlation analysis is then performed to explore the relationship between housing tenure and other variables (marital power, family structure, and marital satisfaction) separately for the male and female respondents. Finally, models are constructed to examine the associations between marital power, marital satisfaction, and the variables of interest.

This study aims to investigate the potential impact of housing tenure on marital power and marital satisfaction, specifically focusing on the differences between "self-owned" housing and other types of housing ownership, such as "parent-owned" and "in-laws-owned". The analysis starts by comparing respondents with "self-owned" housing to those with alternative housing tenures. Then, the study examines the distinct effects of "parent-owned" housing on spouses by using respondents with "landlord-owned" housing as a reference group. To further explore the moderating effect of housing tenure, male respondents with "in-laws owned", female respondents from "parent-owned", and both male and female respondents from "matrilocal residence" are excluded from the analysis.

A hierarchical regression was employed to examine the impact of housing tenure on marital power and marital satisfaction, including the potential moderating effects and mediating pathways. This approach, similar to path analysis, allows for the sequential addition of variables and interaction terms to observe their individual effects, moderating effects on other variables, and potential influence on the dependent variable through the mediating variables. Relevant control variables were included to account for their impact. The analysis began with constructing a marital power model, gradually adding the housing tenure variable and its interaction term with family structure.

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<sup>5</sup> 1 USD = NT 32

Subsequently, a marital satisfaction model was developed, which incorporated the housing tenure variable and its interaction terms with family structure and marital power. By analyzing the regression results from both models, this study examines whether housing tenure influences marital satisfaction through the mediating effect of marital power.

Marital power and satisfaction were assessed by using ordinal scale responses, which indicate non-normally distributed continuous variables. The commonly used modeling technique for such variables is the ordered logit model<sup>6</sup>, also known as the proportional odds (PO) model. However, if the assumption of PO did not hold, the partial proportional odds (PPO) model was used as an alternative. The PPO model allows covariates that meet the PO assumption to have the same effect on the dependent variable, while those that do not meet the assumption can have varying effects at different levels of the dependent variable.<sup>7</sup> Compared to ordinary least squares (OLS) and multinomial logit (MNL) models, the PPO model provides better explanatory power by considering the sequence of dependent variables and the impact of important independent variables on the model (O'Connell and Liu, 2011).

Dependent variables were assigned numerical values for ease of statistical modeling. Marital power was coded as 1 for "more", 2 for "equal", and 3 for "less". Marital satisfaction was numbered 1 for "very satisfied", 2 for "satisfied", and 3 for "dissatisfied". Lower values indicated less marital power or higher marital satisfaction. The models compared the most marital power or highest satisfaction (1) with less power and lower satisfaction (2 and 3, respectively) in Panel 1, and compared more marital power or higher satisfaction (1 and 2, respectively) with less marital power or lowest satisfaction (3) in Panel 2.

#### 4. Results

The total sample consisted of 2,683 respondents, with 51% (1,368) being male and 49% (1,315) being female. After removing 208 respondents (3%), including

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<sup>6</sup> In the PO model, each independent variable estimates the threshold for different dependent variable categories. The odds ratio in the final model is calculated by aggregating the event probabilities of the numerator. This model, also known as the cumulative logit model, assumes that independent variables act independently of the cumulative logit thresholds. The odds ratios at the thresholds are proportional, making it a proportional odds assumption. The regression lines of the independent variables at different cumulative logit odds ratios are parallel, except for the intercept term. This parallel regression assumption characterizes the PO model.

<sup>7</sup> In contrast to the PO model, the PPO model relaxes the assumption that all estimated results of independent variables must meet certain criteria. The PPO model allows for disproportionate odds ratios at cumulative logit thresholds and unparallel regression lines for certain independent variables. This means that the estimated results at cumulative logit thresholds may have varying regression coefficient values, cumulative logit odds ratios, and intercept term values for non-compliant independent variables.

those with "matrilocal residence", male respondents in "in-laws owned" housing, and female respondents in "parent-owned" housing, the remaining sample included 2,475 respondents, with 53% (1,319) male and 46% (1,156) female respondents. Descriptive statistics and a gender difference test (Table 1) revealed no significant differences in the sample structure of each variable after the removal of the 208 respondents.

Among the total sample of 2,683 respondents, significant differences were found between the male and female respondents for various variables, except household income and city of residence. The patterns of housing tenure differed between male and female respondents. A larger proportion of male respondents are in "parent-owned" housing (31%) compared to the female respondents (8%). Conversely, a larger proportion of female respondents are in "in-laws-owned" housing (24%) compared to the male respondents (2%). This indicates that housing tenure by the parents of the husband is common in Taiwan. The male respondents reported higher levels of marital satisfaction, with a larger proportion who are "very satisfied" (42%) compared to the female respondents (30%), and a smaller proportion who are "dissatisfied" (3%) compared to the female respondents (9%). In terms of marital power, the male respondents have slightly less power in family decision-making but more power in housework responsibilities compared to the female respondents. This indicates that in Taiwan, women commonly make decisions regarding household finances and expenditures, including daily necessities, savings, investments, insurance, and high-value consumer goods (nearly 40%). Housework responsibilities also show gender-specific patterns, with approximately 65% of the husbands spending less than 90% of the time that their wife would spend on housework, while 70% of the wives spend more than 110% of the time that their husband would spend on housework. Neolocal residence is the most common family structure for both the male and female respondents (nearly 70%), followed by patrilocal residence (30% and 24% among the male and female respondents, respectively), while matrilocal residence is less common (3% and 8% among the male and female respondents, respectively). The male respondents generally rated their spouse relationship slightly better than the female respondents, with higher scores in conjugal relation and emotional sharing frequency, and lower scores in conflict coping.

**Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Gender Difference Test**

|                             | Male        |      | Female      |      | Difference | Male        |      | Female      |      | Difference |
|-----------------------------|-------------|------|-------------|------|------------|-------------|------|-------------|------|------------|
|                             | N=1,368 (A) |      | N=1,315 (A) |      |            | N=1,319 (B) |      | N=1,156 (B) |      |            |
|                             | N=2,683     |      |             |      |            | N=2,475     |      |             |      |            |
|                             | Mean        | SD   | Mean        | SD   |            | Mean        | SD   | Mean        | SD   |            |
| <b>Housing tenure</b>       |             |      |             |      | ***        |             |      |             |      | ***        |
| Self-owned house            | 0.47        | 0.50 | 0.49        | 0.50 |            | 0.48        | 0.50 | 0.54        | 0.50 |            |
| Parent-owned house          | 0.31        | 0.46 | 0.08        | 0.27 |            | 0.32        | 0.46 | —           | —    |            |
| In-laws-owned house         | 0.02        | 0.14 | 0.24        | 0.43 |            | —           | —    | 0.26        | 0.44 |            |
| Landlord-owned house        | 0.20        | 0.40 | 0.19        | 0.39 |            | 0.21        | 0.41 | 0.20        | 0.40 |            |
| <b>Marital satisfaction</b> |             |      |             |      | ***        |             |      |             |      | ***        |
| Very satisfied              | 0.42        | 0.49 | 0.30        | 0.46 |            | 0.41        | 0.49 | 0.29        | 0.45 |            |
| Satisfied                   | 0.55        | 0.50 | 0.62        | 0.49 |            | 0.55        | 0.50 | 0.62        | 0.48 |            |
| Dissatisfied                | 0.03        | 0.18 | 0.09        | 0.28 |            | 0.03        | 0.18 | 0.09        | 0.28 |            |
| <b>Marital power</b>        |             |      |             |      |            |             |      |             |      |            |
| Making family decisions     |             |      |             |      | ***        |             |      |             |      | ***        |
| More                        | 0.30        | 0.46 | 0.39        | 0.49 |            | 0.30        | 0.46 | 0.39        | 0.49 |            |
| Equal                       | 0.36        | 0.48 | 0.34        | 0.47 |            | 0.36        | 0.48 | 0.33        | 0.47 |            |
| Less                        | 0.34        | 0.47 | 0.28        | 0.45 |            | 0.34        | 0.47 | 0.28        | 0.45 |            |
| Housework division          |             |      |             |      | ***        |             |      |             |      | ***        |
| More                        | 0.65        | 0.48 | 0.08        | 0.27 |            | 0.65        | 0.48 | 0.07        | 0.26 |            |
| Equal                       | 0.26        | 0.44 | 0.21        | 0.41 |            | 0.25        | 0.43 | 0.21        | 0.41 |            |
| Less                        | 0.10        | 0.30 | 0.71        | 0.46 |            | 0.10        | 0.30 | 0.72        | 0.45 |            |
| <b>Family structure</b>     |             |      |             |      | ***        |             |      |             |      | ***        |
| Neolocal residence          | 0.67        | 0.47 | 0.68        | 0.47 |            | 0.69        | 0.46 | 0.75        | 0.44 |            |
| Patrilocal residence        | 0.30        | 0.46 | 0.24        | 0.43 |            | 0.31        | 0.46 | 0.25        | 0.44 |            |
| Matrilocal residence        | 0.03        | 0.16 | 0.08        | 0.27 |            | —           | —    | —           | —    |            |

(Continued...)

(Table 1 Continued)

|  | <b>Male</b> |       | <b>Female</b> |       | <b>Difference</b> | <b>Male</b> |       | <b>Female</b> |       | <b>Difference</b> |
|--|-------------|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------|-------------|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------|
|  | N=1,368 (A) |       | N=1,315 (A)   |       |                   | N=1,319 (B) |       | N=1,156 (B)   |       |                   |
|  | N=2,683     |       |               |       |                   | N=2,475     |       |               |       |                   |
|  | Mean        | SD    | Mean          | SD    |                   | Mean        | SD    | Mean          | SD    |                   |
| <b>Housing tenure</b>                            |             |       |               |       | ***               |             |       |               |       | ***               |
| Self-owned house                                 | 0.47        | 0.50  | 0.49          | 0.50  |                   | 0.48        | 0.50  | 0.54          | 0.50  |                   |
| Parent-owned house                               | 0.31        | 0.46  | 0.08          | 0.27  |                   | 0.32        | 0.46  | —             | —     |                   |
| In-laws-owned house                              | 0.02        | 0.14  | 0.24          | 0.43  |                   | —           | —     | 0.26          | 0.44  |                   |
| Landlord-owned house                             | 0.20        | 0.40  | 0.19          | 0.39  |                   | 0.21        | 0.41  | 0.20          | 0.40  |                   |
| <b>Spousal relationship#</b>                     |             |       |               |       |                   |             |       |               |       |                   |
| Conjugal relations                               | 4.39        | 0.86  | 4.25          | 0.91  | ***               | 4.39        | 0.86  | 4.24          | 0.91  | ***               |
| Sharing frequency                                | 6.83        | 2.13  | 6.65          | 2.30  | **                | 6.82        | 2.14  | 6.56          | 2.32  | ***               |
| Conflict coping                                  | 3.34        | 1.14  | 3.44          | 1.19  | **                | 3.34        | 1.14  | 3.43          | 1.18  | *                 |
| <b>Demographic characteristics</b>               |             |       |               |       |                   |             |       |               |       |                   |
| Birth cohort                                     |             |       |               |       | ***               |             |       |               |       | **                |
| After 1980                                       | 0.40        | 0.49  | 0.47          | 0.50  |                   | 0.39        | 0.49  | 0.43          | 0.50  |                   |
| 1970-1979  | 0.27        | 0.44  | 0.21          | 0.41  |                   | 0.26        | 0.44  | 0.22          | 0.41  |                   |
| Before 1969                                      | 0.34        | 0.47  | 0.31          | 0.46  |                   | 0.35        | 0.48  | 0.35          | 0.48  |                   |
| Age#   | 46.35       | 14.04 | 44.77         | 13.86 | ***               | 46.64       | 14.11 | 45.99         | 14.19 |                   |
| Age of spouse#                                   | 44.07       | 13.29 | 47.64         | 15.08 | ***               | 44.31       | 13.37 | 49.02         | 15.36 | ***               |
| Length of marriage (year)#                       | 17.17       | 15.85 | 18.25         | 16.33 | *                 | 17.44       | 15.96 | 19.85         | 16.64 | ***               |
| Differences of spouses                           |             |       |               |       |                   |             |       |               |       |                   |
| Age (minus spouse's age)#                        | 2.28        | 3.62  | -2.87         | 4.02  | ***               | 2.33        | 3.63  | -3.02         | 4.04  | ***               |
| Income (greater than or equal to that of spouse) | 0.76        | 0.42  | 0.26          | 0.44  | ***               | 0.76        | 0.43  | 0.25          | 0.43  | ***               |
| Household income (monthly)                       |             |       |               |       |                   |             |       |               |       | **                |

(Continued...)



(Table 1 Continued)

|                       | Male        |      | Female      |      | Difference | Male        |      | Female      |      | Difference |
|-----------------------|-------------|------|-------------|------|------------|-------------|------|-------------|------|------------|
|                       | N=1,368 (A) |      | N=1,315 (A) |      |            | N=1,319 (B) |      | N=1,156 (B) |      |            |
|                       | N=2,683     |      |             |      |            | N=2,475     |      |             |      |            |
|                       | Mean        | SD   | Mean        | SD   |            | Mean        | SD   | Mean        | SD   |            |
| <b>Housing tenure</b> |             |      |             |      | ***        |             |      |             |      | ***        |
| Self-owned house      | 0.47        | 0.50 | 0.49        | 0.50 |            | 0.48        | 0.50 | 0.54        | 0.50 |            |
| Parent-owned house    | 0.31        | 0.46 | 0.08        | 0.27 |            | 0.32        | 0.46 | —           | —    |            |
| In-laws-owned house   | 0.02        | 0.14 | 0.24        | 0.43 |            | —           | —    | 0.26        | 0.44 |            |
| Landlord-owned house  | 0.20        | 0.40 | 0.19        | 0.39 |            | 0.21        | 0.41 | 0.20        | 0.40 |            |
| Less than NT 49,999   | 0.28        | 0.45 | 0.30        | 0.46 |            | 0.29        | 0.45 | 0.32        | 0.47 |            |
| NT 50,000-99,999      | 0.33        | 0.47 | 0.33        | 0.47 |            | 0.32        | 0.47 | 0.32        | 0.47 |            |
| NT 100,000-149,999    | 0.23        | 0.42 | 0.20        | 0.40 |            | 0.23        | 0.42 | 0.18        | 0.39 |            |
| NT 150,000 or above   | 0.17        | 0.37 | 0.17        | 0.38 |            | 0.16        | 0.37 | 0.18        | 0.39 |            |
| Has one child or more | 0.87        | 0.34 | 0.89        | 0.31 | *          | 0.87        | 0.33 | 0.91        | 0.29 | ***        |
| Lives in the city     | 0.38        | 0.49 | 0.39        | 0.49 |            | 0.38        | 0.48 | 0.39        | 0.49 |            |

**Notes:** (1) # means continuous variables, the others are category variables; (2) Mean (or proportion) for men and women significantly different. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; and (3) 1 USD = NT 32

Among the demographic characteristics, the male respondents are slightly older on average (46 years old) compared to the female respondents (45 years old), and the average age of their spouse is lower for the male respondents (44 years old) than the female respondents (48 years old). The average length of marriage is 17 years for the male respondents and 18 years for the female respondents. The dominant age match pattern is "husband older than wife", with an average age difference of 2.28 years for the male respondents and 2.87 years for the female respondents. The proportion of "income greater than or equal to the spouse's income" is higher among the male respondents (76%) than female respondents (26%). The majority of both male and female respondents have at least one child (87% and 89%, respectively). There are no significant differences between the male and female respondents in terms of "household monthly income" and "city of residence".

#### 4.1 Correlation Analysis of Housing Tenure

Table 2 lists the significant correlations between housing tenure and marital satisfaction as well as marital power. However, the strength of these correlations, measured by Cramer's V values, is low (all below 0.1). Housing tenure shows a significant correlation with both family decision-making power and housework division among the female respondents, but only with family decision-making power among the male respondents.

The male respondents in "in-laws-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of those who responded with "very satisfied" (50%) or "dissatisfied" (7%), while the female respondents in "parent-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of those who responded with "very satisfied" (38%). Those in "landlord-owned" housing are the largest proportion of the respondents who responded with "dissatisfied" (12%). After excluding male respondents in "in-laws-owned" housing, the female respondents in "parent-owned" housing, and respondents in "matrilocal residence", the analysis revealed that male respondents in "self-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of those who are "very satisfied" (45%), followed by those in "landlord-owned" housing (41%). Among the female respondents, those in "landlord-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of those who are both "satisfied" (34%) and "dissatisfied" (12%).

Among the male respondents, those in "parent-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of having more power in family decision-making (over 30%), while those in "self-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of having less power in family decision-making (approximately 37%). Among the female respondents, those in "self-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of having more power in family decision-making (over 40%), while those in "in-laws-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of having less power in family decision-making (over 30%), and those in "landlord-owned" housing comprise the largest proportion of having "equal" power in family decision-

making (over 35%). Additionally, when the house is owned by their parents, females have the highest proportion of power in housework division (12%), followed by when the house is owned by the couple (9%). Moreover, the proportion of female respondents in either "self-owned housing" or "landlord-owned" housing comprises over 70% of those with less power in the division of housework. Notably, "parent-owned" housing positively influences marital power, particularly in terms of family decision-making power among the male respondents and division of housework power among the female respondents.

Housing tenure is strongly correlated with family structure (Cramer's  $V > 0.5$  for both male and female respondents), with a higher correlation observed among the females. "Self-owned" housing is associated with "neolocal residence", while "parent-owned" (among males) and "in-laws-owned" (among females) housing is linked to "patrilocal residence". Among the males, "in-laws-owned" housing and among females, "parent-owned" housing are related to "matrilocal residence". Housing tenure is also significantly correlated with emotional sharing frequency, with the highest average frequency observed for "landlord-owned" housing among males and "in-laws-owned" housing among the females.

Housing tenure is significantly correlated with various demographic characteristics among both the male and female respondents. The proportion of "parent-owned" or "landlord-owned" housing decreases with the birth cohort. Marriage length is the longest for those with "self-owned" housing, followed by "landlord-owned", and lowest for "parent-owned", thus indicating housing tenure differences across the family life-cycle. "Parent-owned" housing is associated with a larger proportion of those with an income equal to or greater than the income of their spouse. "Landlord-owned" housing is linked to a larger proportion of those with an income in the range of NT50,000 - 99,999 and NT150,000<sup>8</sup> or above. Housing tenure influences household income polarization, particularly for "self-owned" housing. The majority of those with "self-owned" housing have one child or more. "Landlord-owned" housing is more prevalent in high-house price index (HPI) areas.

#### 4.2 Effect of Housing Tenure on Family Decision-making Power

Table 3 presents the findings of the family decision-making power (D) model, which indicates the significant impact of housing tenure on decision-making power. The results show that when housing tenure is "parent-owned", husbands have more decision-making power, followed by "self-owned", while "landlord-owned" erodes their power. Family structure does not have a significant effect on their power. In the WD(1) model, "parent-owned" housing further erodes the power of the wives ( $e^{-0.45}=0.64$ ), more so than those in "in-laws-owned" ( $e^{-0.34}=0.71$ ) housing compared to those in "self-owned" housing. Family structure

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<sup>8</sup> 1 USD = NT 32

**Table 2**      **Correlation Analysis of Housing Tenure**  
**Sample (A)**

|   | <b>Male</b> |              |               |                |        | <b>Female</b> |              |               |                |        |
|---|-------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|--------|---------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
|   | N=1,368     |              |               |                |        | N=1,315       |              |               |                |        |
| <b>Housing tenure</b><br>%(column percent)/mean | Self-owned  | Parent-owned | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  | Self-owned    | Parent-owned | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  |
| <b>Marital satisfaction</b>                     |             |              |               |                | **     |               |              |               |                | ***    |
| Very satisfied                                  | 45.38       | 34.92        | 50            | 41.79          | (0.07) | 30.19         | 37.96        | 22.76         | 33.33          | (0.09) |
| Satisfied                                       | 51.96       | 60.81        | 42.86         | 54.64          |        | 61.3          | 54.63        | 70.19         | 54.62          |        |
| Dissatisfied                                    | 2.66        | 4.28         | 7.14          | 3.57           |        | 8.51          | 7.41         | 7.05          | 12.05          |        |
| <b>Marital power</b>                            |             |              |               |                |        |               |              |               |                |        |
| Making family decisions                         |             |              |               |                | **     |               |              |               |                | **     |
| More  | 29.58       | 34.2         | 21.43         | 25.36          | (0.07) | 43.81         | 34.26        | 31.73         | 36.95          | (0.08) |
| Equal   | 33.33       | 37.77        | 42.86         | 38.21          |        | 30.96         | 35.19        | 35.9          | 36.55          |        |
| Less  | 37.09       | 28.03        | 35.71         | 36.43          |        | 25.23         | 30.56        | 32.37         | 26.51          |        |
| Housework division                              |             |              |               |                |        |               |              |               |                | ***    |
| More  | 65.73       | 63.42        | 50            | 65.36          |        | 8.98          | 12.04        | 5.45          | 6.43           | (0.09) |
| Equal   | 23.94       | 28.27        | 35.71         | 24.29          |        | 17.34         | 26.85        | 28.21         | 21.29          |        |
| Less  | 10.33       | 8.31         | 14.29         | 10.36          |        | 73.68         | 61.11        | 66.35         | 72.29          |        |
| <b>Family structure</b>                         |             |              |               |                | ***    |               |              |               |                | ***    |
| Neolocal residence                              | 86.23       | 32.3         | 42.86         | 79.64          | (0.49) | 89.94         | 29.63        | 26.92         | 79.12          | (0.53) |
| Patrilocal residence                            | 12.36       | 66.51        | 7.14          | 17.86          |        | 6.66          | 23.15        | 68.27         | 15.26          |        |
| Matrilocal residence                            | 1.41        | 1.19         | 50            | 2.5            |        | 3.41          | 47.22        | 4.81          | 5.62           |        |

(Continued...)

{Sample (A) Continued}

|  | Male           |                  |                  |                    |        | Female     |                  |                  |                    |        |
|--|----------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------|------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------|
|  | N=1,368        |                  |                  |                    |        | N=1,315    |                  |                  |                    |        |
| Housing tenure<br>%(column percent)/mean   | Self-<br>owned | Parent-<br>owned | In-laws<br>owned | Landlord-<br>owned | Corr.  | Self-owned | Parent-<br>owned | In-laws<br>owned | Landlord-<br>owned | Corr.  |
| <b>Spouses relationship#</b>               |                |                  |                  |                    |        |            |                  |                  |                    |        |
| Conjugal relations                         | 4.41           | 4.32             | 4.32             | 4.47               |        | 4.23       | 4.25             | 4.31             | 4.20               |        |
| Sharing frequency                          | 6.61           | 7.01             | 7.01             | 7.08               | ***    | 6.30       | 7.10             | 7.16             | 6.72               | ***    |
| Conflict coping                            | 3.34           | 3.35             | 3.35             | 3.30               |        | 3.41       | 3.48             | 3.45             | 3.49               |        |
| <b>Demographic characteristics</b>         |                |                  |                  |                    |        |            |                  |                  |                    |        |
| Birth cohort                               |                |                  |                  |                    | ***    |            |                  |                  |                    | ***    |
| After 1980                                 | 22.85          | 57.48            | 60.71            | 48.57              | (0.29) | 29.26      | 75.93            | 68.91            | 55.02              | (0.32) |
| 1970-1979                                  | 24.41          | 30.17            | 32.14            | 26.07              |        | 20.59      | 21.3             | 24.04            | 20.08              |        |
| Before 1969                                | 52.74          | 12.35            | 7.14             | 25.36              |        | 50.15      | 2.78             | 7.05             | 24.9               |        |
| Length of marriage#                        | 24.05          | 9.56             | 9.89             | 13.60              | ***    | 25.26      | 7.29             | 10.24            | 14.87              | ***    |
| Difference of spouses                      |                |                  |                  |                    |        |            |                  |                  |                    |        |
| Age (minus spouse age)#                    | 2.71           | 1.92             | 1.92             | 2.00               | ***    | -3.25      | -1.85            | -2.60            | -2.68              | ***    |
| Income                                     |                |                  |                  |                    | ***    |            |                  |                  |                    |        |
| greater than or equal to<br>that of spouse | 66.98          | 87.89            | 75               | 81.07              | (0.22) | 25.85      | 30.56            | 27.88            | 21.29              |        |
| less than that of spouse                   | 33.02          | 12.11            | 25               | 18.93              |        | 74.15      | 69.44            | 72.12            | 78.71              |        |
| Household income                           |                |                  |                  |                    | ***    |            |                  |                  |                    | ***    |
| Less than NT 49,999                        | 36.46          | 21.62            | 10.71            | 19.64              | (0.13) | 37.77      | 19.44            | 19.55            | 27.71              | (0.16) |
| NT 50,000-99,999                           | 24.88          | 42.52            | 57.14            | 35                 |        | 23.53      | 40.74            | 47.76            | 33.73              |        |
| NT 100,000-149,999                         | 20.03          | 23.28            | 17.86            | 27.5               |        | 17.34      | 29.63            | 22.12            | 19.28              |        |
| NT 150,000 or above                        | 18.62          | 12.59            | 14.29            | 17.86              |        | 21.36      | 10.19            | 10.58            | 19.28              |        |

(Continued...)

## {Sample (A) Continued}

|   | <b>Male</b> |              |               |                |        | <b>Female</b> |              |               |                |        |
|---|-------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|--------|---------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
| <b>Housing tenure</b><br>%(column percent)/mean | Self-owned  | Parent-owned | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  | Self-owned    | Parent-owned | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  |
| Child   |             |              |               |                |        |               |              |               |                |        |
| Has one child or more                           | 93.27       | 84.32        | 71.43         | 78.21          | ***    | 93.5          | 82.41        | 86.86         | 83.94          | ***    |
| No child  | 6.73        | 15.68        | 28.57         | 21.79          | (0.19) | 6.5           | 17.59        | 13.14         | 16.06          | (0.14) |
| City  |             |              |               |                |        |               |              |               |                |        |
| High HPI country                                | 36.31       | 33.49        | 60.71         | 46.43          | ***    | 38.54         | 34.26        | 34.29         | 45.78          | **     |
| Other   | 63.69       | 66.51        | 39.29         | 53.57          | (0.12) | 61.46         | 65.74        | 65.71         | 54.22          | (0.08) |

## Sample (B)

|   | <b>Male</b> |              |                |        | <b>Female</b> |               |                |        |
|---|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
|   | N=1,319     |              |                |        | N=1,156       |               |                |        |
| <b>Housing tenure</b><br>%(column percent)/mean | Self-owned  | Parent-owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  | Self-owned    | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  |
| <b>Marital satisfaction</b>                     |             |              |                | **     |               |               |                | ***    |
| Very satisfied                                  | 45.24       | 34.86        | 41.03          | (0.07) | 29.97         | 22.9          | 33.62          | (0.08) |
| Satisfied                                       | 52.06       | 60.82        | 55.31          |        | 61.86         | 70.37         | 54.04          |        |
| Dissatisfied                                    | 2.7         | 4.33         | 3.66           |        | 8.17          | 6.73          | 12.34          |        |
| <b>Marital power</b>                            |             |              |                |        |               |               |                |        |
| Making family decisions                         |             |              |                | **     |               |               |                | ***    |
| More  | 29.37       | 33.89        | 26.01          | (0.07) | 43.59         | 30.98         | 36.6           | (0.08) |
| Equal   | 33.17       | 38.22        | 38.1           |        | 30.45         | 36.36         | 36.17          |        |
| Less  | 37.46       | 27.88        | 35.9           |        | 25.96         | 32.66         | 27.23          |        |

(Continued...)

{Sample (B) Continued}

|   | <b>Male</b> |              |                |        | <b>Female</b> |               |                |        |
|---|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
|   | N=1,319     |              |                |        | N=1,156       |               |                |        |
| <b>Housing tenure</b><br>%(column percent)/mean | Self-owned  | Parent-owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  | Self-owned    | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  |
| Housework division                              |             |              |                |        |               |               |                | ***    |
| More  | 66.03       | 63.7         | 65.2           |        | 8.65          | 5.39          | 5.96           | (0.08) |
| Equal   | 23.49       | 27.88        | 24.54          |        | 17.47         | 27.27         | 21.7           |        |
| Less  | 10.48       | 8.41         | 10.26          |        | 73.88         | 67.34         | 72.34          |        |
| <b>Family structure</b>                         |             |              |                | ***    |               |               |                | ***    |
| Neolocal residence                              | 87.46       | 32.69        | 81.68          | (0.53) | 93.11         | 28.28         | 83.83          | (0.63) |
| Patrilocal residence                            | 12.54       | 67.31        | 18.32          |        | 6.89          | 71.72         | 16.17          |        |
| Matrilocal residence                            | —           | —            | —              |        | —             | —             | —              |        |
| <b>Spouses relationship#</b>                    |             |              |                |        |               |               |                |        |
| Conjugal relations                              | 4.41        | 4.31         | 4.47           | *      | 4.23          | 4.31          | 4.17           |        |
| Sharing frequency                               | 6.60        | 7.00         | 7.07           | ***    | 6.25          | 7.13          | 6.63           | ***    |
| Conflict coping                                 | 3.35        | 3.35         | 3.29           |        | 3.41          | 3.42          | 3.49           |        |
| <b>Demographic characteristics</b>              |             |              |                |        |               |               |                |        |
| Birth cohort                                    |             |              |                | ***    |               |               |                | ***    |
| After 1980                                      | 22.54       | 57.45        | 48.35          | (0.29) | 27.72         | 67.34         | 54.04          | (0.3)  |
| 1970-1979                                       | 24.13       | 30.05        | 25.64          |        | 20.51         | 25.25         | 20             |        |
| Before 1969                                     | 53.33       | 12.5         | 26.01          |        | 51.76         | 7.41          | 25.96          |        |
| Length of marriage#                             | 24.21       | 9.59         | 13.76          | ***    | 25.91         | 10.62         | 15.41          | ***    |
| Difference of spouses                           |             |              |                |        |               |               |                |        |
| Age (minus spouse age)#                         | 2.72        | 1.94         | 2.03           | ***    | -3.33         | -2.62         | -2.70          | **     |

(Continued...)

## {Sample (B) Continued}

|   | <b>Male</b> |              |                |        | <b>Female</b> |               |                |        |
|---|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
|   | N=1,319     |              |                |        | N=1,156       |               |                |        |
| <b>Housing tenure</b><br>%(column percent)/mean | Self-owned  | Parent-owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  | Self-owned    | In-laws owned | Landlord-owned | Corr.  |
| Income  |             |              |                | ***    |               |               |                |        |
| greater than or equal to<br>that of spouse      | 66.51       | 87.98        | 81.32          | (0.23) | 25.8          | 26.6          | 21.28          |        |
| less than that of spouse                        | 33.49       | 12.02        | 18.68          |        | 74.2          | 73.4          | 78.72          |        |
| Household income                                |             |              |                | ***    |               |               |                | ***    |
| Less than NT 49,999                             | 36.83       | 21.63        | 19.78          | (0.16) | 39.1          | 19.87         | 28.51          | (0.18) |
| NT 50,000-99,999                                | 24.76       | 42.31        | 35.16          |        | 23.24         | 47.14         | 34.04          |        |
| NT 100,000-149,999                              | 20.16       | 23.56        | 27.11          |        | 16.67         | 21.89         | 17.87          |        |
| NT 150,000 or above                             | 18.25       | 12.5         | 17.95          |        | 20.99         | 11.11         | 19.57          |        |
| Child   |             |              |                |        |               |               |                |        |
| Has one child or more                           | 93.33       | 84.13        | 77.66          | ***    | 93.75         | 88.89         | 84.26          | ***    |
| No child  | 6.67        | 15.87        | 22.34          | (0.19) | 6.25          | 11.11         | 15.74          | (0.13) |
| City  |             |              |                |        |               |               |                |        |
| High HPI country                                | 36.51       | 33.17        | 46.52          | ***    | 38.3          | 34.01         | 45.53          | **     |
| Other   | 63.49       | 66.83        | 53.48          | (0.1)  | 61.7          | 65.99         | 54.47          | (0.08) |

**Notes:** (1) (A) The analysis includes the full sample. (B) The analysis excludes male participants living in their in-laws' house, female participants living in their parents' house, and those who live in a matrilocal residence; (2) # means continuous variables, the other are category variables; (3) Correlation test for category variables is chi-square test, in brackets is Cramer V, and for continuous variable is ANOVA. Mean (or proportion) for housing tenure significant correlation. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; and (4) 1 USD = NT 32



only influences the marital power of the wives. Additionally, compared to "neolocal residence", "matrilocal residence" increases the power of the wives by 48% ( $e^{0.39}=1.48$ ).

The impact of demographic characteristics on power differs between the husbands and wives. In the MD(1) and WD(1) models, both spouses have more power when they are the older spouse. Wives have more power when their income exceeds or is equal to that of their spouse. In the "after 1980" birth cohort, the male respondents have greater odds of more power, while the female respondents have lower odds. Each one-year age difference increases the power of the husbands by 4%, and also increases the odds of the wives having much more power against less power by 4% ( $e^{0.04}=1.04$ ) (Panel 2). When the income of the wives exceed or is equal to that of their husband, their power is increased by 47% ( $e^{0.38}=1.47$ ). Having one child or more increase the odds of the wives having much more power against less power by 64% ( $e^{0.38}=1.64$ ) (Panel 2). Birth cohort has a contrasting effect on the power of both spouses. Compared to the "before 1969" birth cohort, the "after 1980" birth cohort has increased odds of more power against very little power by 58% ( $e^{0.46}=1.58$ ) among the male respondents but among the female respondents, such power is reduced by 28% ( $e^{-0.33}=0.72$ ). The "after 1980" birth cohort has increased odds of much more power against little power by 156% ( $e^{0.94}=2.56$ ) among the male respondents, while the "1970-1979" birth cohort has increased odds of much more power by 88% ( $e^{0.63}=1.88$ ) among the male respondents.

The interaction of housing tenure and family structure was tested for its moderating effect. In the MD(3) and MD(4) models, the effect of matrilocal residence on the power of the husbands varies depending on the type of housing tenure. For the male respondents, when housing tenure is "in-laws-owned" or "self-owned", matrilocal residence increases the odds of more power by 688% ( $e^{2.06}=7.88$ ) or 535% ( $e^{1.85}=6.35$ ) respectively. However, when housing tenure is "landlord-owned", matrilocal residence reduces the odds of more power by 85% ( $e^{-1.88}=0.15$ ). In the WD(3) and WD(4) models, when housing tenure is "in-laws-owned", patrilocal residence reduces the odds of more power by 56% to 61% ( $e^{-0.82}=0.44$  and  $e^{-0.94}=0.39$ ) among the female respondents.

After excluding the male respondents who reside in "in-laws-owned" housing and practicing matrilocal residence (3% of the male respondents in Table 1), the moderating effect of housing tenure was retested. In the MD(5) and MD(6) models, only the direct effect of housing tenure on the power of the husbands is described. Under the housing tenure of "landlord-owned", the power of the husbands is only 78% ( $e^{-0.25}=0.78$ ) of that of those who fall under the housing tenure of "self-owned". The interaction of housing tenure and family structure does not significantly affect the power of the husband.

**Table 3 Results of Model for Power in Making Family Decisions for Housing Tenure**

| Dep. var: <b>Power of Making Family Decisions</b> |       | <b>Male</b> |         |         |         |             |         | <b>Female</b> |         |         |         |
|---|-------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|
|   |       | N=1,368 (A) |         |         |         | N=1,319 (B) |         | N=1,315 (A)   |         |         |         |
| Model No.   |       | MD(1)       | MD(2)   | MD(3)   | MD(4)   | MD(5)       | MD(6)   | WD(1)         | WD(2)   | WD(3)   | WD(4)   |
| Coef.   | Panel |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| <b>Housing tenure</b>                             |       |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| Self-owned  |       | Ref.        | 0.29**  | Ref.    | 0.26*   | Ref.        | Ref.    | Ref.          | 0.12    | Ref.    | 0.13    |
| Parent-owned                                      |       | 0.08        | 0.37**  | 0.07    | 0.33    | 0.08        | 0.07    | -0.45**       | -0.33   | -0.10   | 0.02    |
| In-laws owned                                     |       | -0.58       | -0.29   | -0.91   | -0.64   | —           | —       | -0.34**       | -0.22   | -0.03   | 0.10    |
| Landlord-owned                                    |       | -0.29**     | Ref.    | -0.26*  | Ref.    | -0.25*      | -0.26   | -0.12         | Ref.    | -0.13   | Ref.    |
| <b>Family structure</b>                           |       |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| Neolocal residence                                |       | Ref.        | Ref.    | Ref.    | Ref.    | Ref.        | Ref.    | Ref.          | Ref.    | Ref.    | Ref.    |
| Patrilocal residence                              | 1     | 0.00        | 0.00    | 0.04    | 0.05    | -0.08       | 0.04    | -0.07         | -0.07   | 0.37    | 0.48    |
|   | 2     |             |         | -0.13   |         | 0.08        | -0.12   |               |         |         | -0.09   |
| Matrilocal residence                              |       | 0.27        | 0.27    | 0.72    | -0.13   | —           | —       | 0.39*         | 0.39*   | 0.67    | 0.47    |
| <b>Demographic characteristics</b>                |       |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| Difference of spouses                             |       |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| Age (minus age of spouse)                         | 1     | 0.04***     | 0.04*** | 0.04*** | 0.04*** | 0.04**      | 0.04**  | -0.01         | -0.01   | -0.01   | -0.01   |
|   | 2     |             |         |         |         |             |         | 0.04***       | 0.04*** | 0.04*** | 0.04*** |
| Salary (greater than or equal to spouses')        |       | 0.00        | 0.00    | -0.01   | -0.01   | -0.02       | -0.02   | 0.38***       | 0.38*** | 0.39*** | 0.39*** |
| Has one child or more                             | 1     | -0.14       | -0.14   | -0.13   | -0.13   | -0.15       | -0.15   | 0.07          | 0.07    | 0.08    | 0.08    |
|   | 2     |             |         |         |         |             |         | 0.49**        | 0.49**  | 0.49**  | 0.49**  |
| Lives in the city                                 |       | 0.16        | 0.16    | 0.16    | 0.16    | 0.18*       | 0.18*   | 0.00          | 0.00    | 0.00    | 0.00    |
| Birth cohort (ref. Before 1969)                   |       |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| After 1980  | 1     | 0.46***     | 0.46*** | 0.45*** | 0.46*** | 0.43***     | 0.43*** | -0.33**       | -0.33** | -0.37** | -0.37** |
|   | 2     | 0.94***     | 0.94*** | 0.97*** | 0.94*** | 0.93***     | 0.93*** | 0.07          | 0.07    | 0.05    | 0.07    |
| 1970-1979   |       | 0.63***     | 0.63*** | 0.65*** | 0.65*** | 0.63***     | 0.64*** | -0.07         | -0.07   | -0.10   | -0.10   |

*(Continued...)*

**(Table 3 Continued)**

| Dep. var: <b>Power of Making Family Decisions</b> |       | <b>Male</b> |         |         |         |             |         | <b>Female</b> |         |         |         |
|---|-------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|---------------|---------|---------|---------|
|   |       | N=1,368 (A) |         |         |         | N=1,319 (B) |         | N=1,315 (A)   |         |         |         |
| Model No.   |       | MD(1)       | MD(2)   | MD(3)   | MD(4)   | MD(5)       | MD(6)   | WD(1)         | WD(2)   | WD(3)   | WD(4)   |
| Coef.   | Panel |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| <b>Housing tenure x Family structure</b>          |       |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         |         |
| Parent-owned x Patriloc                           |       |             |         | 0.05    | -0.04   |             | 0.05    |               |         | -0.86   | -0.64   |
| Parent-owned x Matrilocal                         |       |             |         | -0.20   | 1.65    |             | —       |               |         | -0.72   | -0.51   |
| In-laws-owned x Patriloc                          | 1     |             |         | -0.14   | -0.27   |             | —       |               |         | -0.82** | -0.94** |
|   | 2     |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         | -0.36   |
| In-laws- owned x Matrilocal                       |       |             |         | 0.22    | 2.06**  |             | —       |               |         | -0.41   | -0.20   |
| Landlord-owned x Patriloc                         | 1     |             |         | 0.10    | —       |             | 0.09    |               |         | 0.16    | —       |
|   | 2     |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         | -0.51   |         |
| Landlord-owned x Matrilocal                       |       |             |         | -1.88** | —       |             | —       |               |         | -0.20   | —       |
| Self-owned x Patriloc                             | 1     |             |         | —       | -0.09   |             | —       |               |         | —       | -0.25   |
|   | 2     |             |         |         |         |             |         |               |         |         | 0.84    |
| Self-owned x Matrilocal                           |       |             |         | —       | 1.85*   |             | —       |               |         | —       | 0.20    |
| Model type  |       | PPO         | PPO     | PPO     | PPO     | PPO         | PPO     | PPO           | PPO     | PPO     | PPO     |
| BIC (covariates)                                  |       | 3032.7      | 3032.7  | 3076.1  | 3070.3  | 2923.1      | 2937.4  | 2922.6        | 2922.6  | 2961.5  | 2073.7  |
| Log-likelihood ratio test ( $\beta=0$ )           |       | 66.5***     | 66.5*** | 73.7*** | 72.3*** | 61.6***     | 61.7*** | 56.5***       | 56.5*** | 67.9*** | 70***   |

**Notes:** (1) (A) The analysis includes the full sample. (B) The analysis excludes male participants living in the house of their in-laws, female participants living in in the house of their parents, and those who live in a matrilocal residence. (2) The value of the dependent variable is set as follows: 1 for “more”, 2 for “equal”, and 3 for “less”; the odds ratio is calculated cumulatively from the smallest ordinal number. (3) Model type, PO model is proportional odds model. PPO is partial proportional odds model. (4) Panel 1 lists the regression coefficient values of more power against less power (1 vs 2, 3), , and Panel 2 lists the regression coefficient values of much more power against less power (1, 2 vs 3). When the estimation result of an independent variable meets the PO assumption, only Panel 1 lists the regression coefficient values and Panel 2 is blank. (5) \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

### 4.3 Effect of Housing Tenure on Division of Housework Power

Table 4 presents the results of the housework division power (H) model, which indicates that housing tenure significantly influences the division of housework power among the husbands and wives. Those with more power in housework division are defined as respondents who undertake less housework compared to their spouse. In the MH(1) and MH(2) models, the odds ratio of "landlord-owned" against "self-owned" housing is  $e^{0.34}=1.4$ , and the odds ratio of "self-owned" against "landlord-owned" housing is ( $e^{-0.34}=0.71$ ) for the male respondents. In the WH(1) and WH(2) models, the odds ratio of "parent-owned" against "landlord-owned" housing is  $e^{0.45}=1.57$  among the female respondents. Clearly, "self-owned" housing leads to less power in the division of housework among the male respondents, while "parent-owned" housing leads to more power in the division of housework among the female respondents.

The impact of the demographic characteristics on power in housework division differs by gender. In the MH(1) and WH(1) models, both genders have more power in the division of housework power when their income is equal to or exceeds that of their spouse, with an odds ratio of  $e^{1.14}=3.12$  higher for the males than the females ( $e^{1.06}=2.9$ ). Having one or more children affects the division of housework power differently for the husbands and wives. The power increases by 170% ( $e^{0.99}=2.7$ ) for the husbands, but is reduced by 31% ( $e^{-0.37}=0.69$ ) for the wives, thus indicating that caring for children increases the housework of the wives. Male respondents who are living in the city show a 29% reduction in housework division power ( $e^{-0.21}=0.81$ ). The birth cohort has an inverse impact on males and females; the power of younger males in the division of housework declines while the opposite is true for their female counterparts.

Then, the interaction between housing tenure and family structure was examined, and the results showed that housing tenure has a significant moderating effect on the power in the division of housework among the female respondents with patrilocal residence but not on the male respondents. In the WH(3) and WH(4) models, the female respondents with patrilocal residence and "parent-owned" housing have more power in housework division ( $e^{1.16}=3.19$ ) than those with the same type of residence but living in an "in-laws-owned" house ( $e^{1.01}=2.75$ ; Panel 2). However, it is rare for wives to reside in parent-owned housing with patrilocal residence in Taiwan. Therefore, the analysis was conducted again after removing these cases and retesting the moderating effect of housing tenure. In the WD(6) model, the female respondents with patrilocal residence and "in-laws-owned" housing still exhibit more power in the division of housework ( $e^{0.93}=2.54$ ).

**Table 4 Results of Model for Power in Housework Division for Housing Tenure**

| Dep. var: <b>Power of Housework division</b> |       | Men         |          |          |          | Women       |         |         |         |             |         |
|--|-------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|-------------|---------|
|  |       | N=1,368 (A) |          |          |          | N=1,315 (A) |         |         |         | N=1,156 (B) |         |
| Model No.                                    |       | MH(1)       | MH(2)    | MH(3)    | MH(4)    | WH(1)       | WH(2)   | WH(3)   | WH(4)   | WH(5)       | WH(6)   |
| Coef   | Panel |             |          |          |          |             |         |         |         |             |         |
| <b>Housing tenure</b>                        |       |             |          |          |          |             |         |         |         |             |         |
| Self-owned                                   |       | Ref.        | -0.34**  | Ref.     | -0.40**  | Ref.        | 0.05    | Ref.    | 0.06    | Ref.        | Ref.    |
| Parent-owned                                 |       | 0.17        | -0.17    | 0.15     | -0.25    | 0.38        | 0.45*   | 0.28    | 0.35    | —           | —       |
| In-laws-owned                                | 1     | 0.13        | -0.21    | -0.23    | -0.63    | -0.48       | 0.27    | -0.01   | 0.05    | 0.28        | 0.01**  |
|  | 2     |             |          |          |          | 0.30        |         |         |         |             |         |
| Landlord-owned                               |       | 0.34**      | Ref.     | 0.40**   | Ref.     | -0.05       | Ref.    | -0.05   | Ref.    | -0.03       | -0.04   |
| <b>Family structure</b>                      |       |             |          |          |          |             |         |         |         |             |         |
| Neolocal residence                           |       | Ref.        | Ref.     | Ref.     | Ref.     | Ref.        | Ref.    | Ref.    | 0.94    | Ref.        | Ref.    |
| Patrilocal residence                         |       | 0.19        | 0.19     | 0.31     | -0.18    | -0.28       | -0.28   | -0.95** | -0.52** | -0.34*      | -0.94** |
| Matrilocal residence                         | 1     | -0.07       | -0.07    | -0.40    | 0.29     | 0.27        | 0.26    | 0.35    | 0.39    | —           | —       |
|  | 2     |             |          |          |          | -0.22       | -0.23   | -0.02   | -0.11   |             |         |
| <b>Demographic characteristics</b>           |       |             |          |          |          |             |         |         |         |             |         |
| Difference of spouses                        |       |             |          |          |          |             |         |         |         |             |         |
| Age (minus age of spouse)                    |       | -0.01       | -0.01    | -0.01    | -0.01    | 0.01        | 0.01    | 0.01    | 0.01    | 0.01        | 0.01    |
| Salary (greater than or equal to spouses')   |       | 1.14***     | 1.14***  | 1.14***  | 1.14***  | 1.06***     | 1.06*** | 1.06*** | 1.06*** | 1.12***     | 1.11*** |
| Has one child or more                        |       | 0.99***     | 0.99***  | 0.99***  | 0.99***  | -0.37**     | -0.38** | -0.36*  | -0.36*  | -0.39*      | -0.38*  |
| Lives in the city                            |       | -0.21*      | -0.21*   | -0.20*   | -0.20*   | 0.03        | 0.03    | 0.02    | 0.02    | 0.07        | 0.07    |
| Birth cohort (ref. Before 1969)              |       |             |          |          |          |             |         |         |         |             |         |
| After 1980                                   |       | -1.26***    | -1.26*** | -1.26*** | -1.26*** | 0.43**      | 0.43**  | 0.44**  | 0.44**  | 0.36**      | 0.37**  |
| 1970-1979                                    |       | -0.84***    | -0.84*** | -0.85*** | -0.85*** | 0.19        | 0.20    | 0.22    | 0.23    | 0.27        | 0.29    |

(Continued...)

(Table 4 Continued)

| Dep. var: Power of Housework division    |       | Men         |          |          |          | Women       |         |          |          |             |         |
|--|-------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------|---------|----------|----------|-------------|---------|
|  |       | N=1,368 (A) |          |          |          | N=1,315 (A) |         |          |          | N=1,156 (B) |         |
| Model No.                                |       | MH(1)       | MH(2)    | MH(3)    | MH(4)    | WH(1)       | WH(2)   | WH(3)    | WH(4)    | WH(5)       | WH(6)   |
| Coef                                     | Panel |             |          |          |          |             |         |          |          |             |         |
| <b>Housing tenure x Family structure</b> |       |             |          |          |          |             |         |          |          |             |         |
| Parent-owned x Patrilocal                |       |             |          | -0.06    | 0.42     |             |         | 1.16*    | 0.72     |             |         |
| Parent-owned x Matrilocal                |       |             |          | 0.02     | -0.66    |             |         | -0.29    | -0.22    |             | —       |
| In-laws-owned x Patrilocal               | 1     |             |          | 0.54     | 1.03     |             |         | 0.16     | 0.48     |             | 0.93*   |
|  | 2     |             |          |          |          |             |         | 1.01*    |          |             |         |
| In-laws-owned x Matrilocal               |       |             |          | 0.90     | 0.22     |             |         | 0.12     | 0.19     |             | —       |
| Landlord-owned x Patrilocal              |       |             |          | -0.49    | —        |             |         | 0.44     | —        |             | 0.46    |
| Landlord-owned x Matrilocal              |       |             |          | 0.68     | —        |             |         | -0.08    | —        |             | —       |
| Self-owned x Patrilocal                  |       |             |          | —        | 0.49     |             |         | —        | -0.45    |             | —       |
| Self-owned x Matrilocal                  |       |             |          | —        | -0.68    |             |         | —        | 0.08     |             | —       |
| Model type                               |       | PO          | PO       | PO       | PO       | PPO         | PPO     | PPO      | PPO      | PO          | PO      |
| BIC (covariates)                         |       | 2301.8      | 2301.8   | 2342.4   | 2342.4   | 2042.6      | 2045.9  | 2082.6   | 2083.5   | 1743.7      | 1754.3  |
| Log-likelihood ratio test ( $\beta=0$ )  |       | 140.9***    | 140.9*** | 143.7*** | 143.7*** | 106.8***    | 96.4*** | 109.9*** | 106.5*** | 78.7***     | 82.2*** |

**Notes:** (1) (A) The analysis includes the full sample. (B) The analysis excludes male participants living in the house of their in-laws, female participants living in in the house of their parents, and those who live in a matrilocal residence. (2) The value of the dependent variable is set as follows: 1 for “more”, 2 for “equal”, and 3 for “less”; the odds ratio is calculated cumulatively from the smallest ordinal number. (3) Model type, PO is proportional odds model. PPO is partial proportional odds model. (4) Panel 1 lists the regression coefficient values of much more power against much less power (1 vs 2, 3), and Panel 2 lists the regression coefficient values of much more power against less power (1, 2 vs 3). When the estimation result of an independent variable meets the PO assumption, only Panel 1 lists the regression coefficient values and Panel 2 is blank. (5) \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

#### 4.4 Effect of Housing Tenure on Marital Satisfaction

The marital satisfaction (S) model in Table 5 indicates that housing tenure has contrasting effects on the marital satisfaction of the male and female respondents. Among the male respondents, those who are residing in "landlord-owned" housing have 30% less marital satisfaction ( $e^{-0.36}=0.7$ ), and "parent-owned" housing have 32% less marital satisfaction ( $e^{-0.39}=0.68$ ) compared to "self-owned" housing individuals (in MS(1) and MS(2)). The female respondents in "parent-owned" housing, followed by "self-owned" housing reported higher marital satisfaction, but the lowest satisfaction was observed with "in-laws-owned" housing (in WS(1) and WS(2)).

Due to the limited sample size of the interaction item on housing tenure and family structure, this study focuses on examining instead the moderating effect of housing tenure among female respondents with patrilocal residence and "parent-owned housing (of the husband)", which are common living arrangements in Taiwan. In the MS(3) and WS(3) models, the impact of housing tenure on marital satisfaction is similar to that described in the MS(1) and WS(1) models. "Landlord-owned" housing has no significant effect on the marital satisfaction of the female respondents compared to those in "self-owned" housing, while both "parent-owned" and "in-laws-owned" housing negatively affect the marital satisfaction of both the male and female respondents.

In the MS(3) and WS(3) models, family structure has no significant effect on the marital satisfaction of the male or female respondents. Marital power significantly impacts the marital satisfaction of males, where more decision-making power leads to less satisfaction ( $e^{-0.31}=0.73$ ), while a smaller share of the housework leads to more satisfaction ( $e^{0.32}=1.5$ ). These findings align with the study done by Taniguchi and Kaufman (2022) in Japan. As Cheng et al. (2016) argue, men tend to have more conservative views on the gender-based division of labor, and accept the traditional role of the husband being responsible for matters outside the house while the wife is responsible for matters inside the house. The quality of the conjugal relationship has a significant impact on the marital satisfaction of both the males and females in the same direction. Higher self-rated spouse emotion and frequency of emotional sharing increase satisfaction, while negative conflict coping behaviors reduce satisfaction. Demographic characteristics have varying effects on marital satisfaction for the male and female respondents. A higher household monthly income increases the satisfaction of the male respondents by 2% ( $e^{0.02}=1.02$ ), but reduces that of the female respondents by 2% ( $e^{-0.02}=0.98$ ). Having one or more children has a negative effect on the satisfaction of the male respondents and reduces their satisfaction by 54% ( $e^{-0.77}=0.46$ ).

**Table 5 Results of Model for Marital Satisfaction for Housing Tenure**

| Dep. var: Marital Satisfaction          | Men         |          |             | Women       |          |             |
|---|-------------|----------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
|   | N=1,368 (A) |          | N=1,319 (B) | N=1,315 (A) |          | N=1,156 (B) |
| Model No.                               | MS (1)      | MS (2)   | MS (3)      | WS (1)      | WS (2)   | WS (3)      |
| <b>Housing tenure</b>                   |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| Self-owned                              | Ref.        | 0.36**   | Ref.        | Ref.        | -0.15    | Ref.        |
| Parent-owned                            | -0.39**     | -0.03    | -0.38**     | 0.73***     | 0.57**   | —           |
| In-laws-owned                           | 0.07        | 0.43     | —           | -0.35*      | -0.50**  | -0.37*      |
| Landlord-owned                          | -0.36**     | Ref.     | -0.39**     | 0.15        | Ref.     | 0.18        |
| <b>Family structure</b>                 |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| Neolocal residence                      | Ref.        | Ref.     | Ref.        | Ref.        | Ref.     | Ref.        |
| Patrilocal residence                    | 0.14        | 0.14     | 0.14        | 0.04        | 0.04     | 0.04        |
| Matrilocal residence                    | 0.71        | 0.71     | —           | -0.18       | -0.18    | —           |
| <b>Marital Power</b>                    |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| Making family decisions (ref. Less)     |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| More                                    | -0.34**     | -0.34**  | -0.31**     | -0.32**     | -0.32**  | -0.22       |
| Equal                                   | -0.11       | -0.11    | -0.09       | -0.02       | -0.02    | 0.02        |
| Housework division (ref. Less)          |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| More                                    | 0.39*       | 0.39*    | 0.41*       | 0.11        | 0.11     | -0.11       |
| Equal                                   | 0.28        | 0.28     | 0.32        | 0.05        | 0.05     | -0.02       |
| <b>Conjugal relationship</b>            |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| Spouse emotion                          | 1.39***     | 1.39***  | 1.35***     | 1.64***     | 1.64***  | 1.64***     |
| Sharing frequency                       | 0.31***     | 0.31***  | 0.31***     | 0.28***     | 0.28***  | 0.29***     |
| Conflict coping                         | -0.24***    | -0.24*** | -0.25***    | -0.18***    | -0.18*** | -0.18***    |
| <b>Demographic characteristics</b>      |             |          |             |             |          |             |
| Household monthly income                | 0.02        | 0.02     | 0.02*       | -0.01       | -0.01    | -0.02*      |
| Has one child or more                   | -0.76***    | -0.76*** | -0.77***    | -0.05       | -0.05    | -0.09       |
| Lives in the city                       | -0.04       | -0.04    | -0.03       | -0.24*      | -0.24*   | -0.21       |
| Control length of marriage              | Y           | Y        | Y           | Y           | Y        | Y           |
| BIC (covariates)                        | 1822.8      | 1822.8   | 1741.4      | 1748.5      | 1767.3   | 1542.1      |
| Log-likelihood ratio test ( $\beta=0$ ) | 529***      | 529***   | 496.6***    | 503.8***    | 655.5*** | 569.3***    |

**Notes:** (1) (A) The analysis includes the full sample. (B) The analysis excludes male participants living in the house of their in-laws, female participants living in the house of their parents, and those who live in a matrilocal residence. (2) The value of the dependent variable is set as follows: 1 for “very satisfied”, 2 for “satisfied”, and 3 for “dissatisfied”; the odds ratio is calculated cumulatively from the smallest ordinal number. (3) Model type is PO (proportional odds model). (4) \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.



Then, the moderating effect of housing tenure was tested. The MS(5) and WS(5) models in Table 6 show that the marital satisfaction of both the male and female respondents is significantly influenced only by the interaction between housing tenure and family decision-making power. Among the males with more power in family decision-making and in "parent-owned" housing, marital satisfaction is reduced by 51% ( $e^{-0.72}=0.49$ ). Among the females with equal power in family decision-making and in "landlord-owned" housing, marital satisfaction is increased by 181% ( $e^{1.03}=2.81$ ).

**Table 6 Results of Model for Marital Satisfaction for Housing Tenure (continued)**

| Dep. var: <b>Marital Satisfaction</b>                    | <b>Men</b>  |          |          | <b>Women</b> |          |        |
|--|-------------|----------|----------|--------------|----------|--------|
|  | N=1,319 (B) |          |          |              |          |        |
| Model No.  | MS (4)      | MS(5)    | MS (6)   | WS (4)       | WS (5)   | WS (6) |
| <b>Housing tenure x Family structure</b>                 |             |          |          |              |          |        |
| Parent-owned x Patrilocal                                | -0.17       |          |          | —            |          |        |
| Landlord-owned x Patrilocal                              | -0.30       |          |          | -0.08        |          |        |
| In-laws-owned x Patrilocal                               | —           |          |          | 0.13         |          |        |
| <b>Housing tenure x Marital Power</b>                    |             |          |          |              |          |        |
| <b>Housing tenure x Power of Making family decisions</b> |             |          |          |              |          |        |
| Parent-owned x More                                      |             | -0.72**  |          |              | —        |        |
| Parent-owned x Equal                                     |             | -0.15    |          |              | —        |        |
| Landlord-owned x More                                    |             | -0.67    |          |              | -0.15    |        |
| Landlord-owned x Equal                                   |             | -0.05    |          |              | 1.03**   |        |
| In-laws-owned x More                                     |             | —        |          |              | -0.04    |        |
| In-laws-owned x Equal                                    |             | —        |          |              | -0.03    |        |
| <b>Housing tenure x Power of Housework division</b>      |             |          |          |              |          |        |
| Parent-owned x More                                      |             |          | -0.54    |              |          | —      |
| Parent-owned x Equal                                     |             |          | -0.66    |              |          | —      |
| Landlord-owned x More                                    |             |          | -0.08    |              |          | -0.30  |
| Landlord-owned x Equal                                   |             |          | -0.17    |              |          | 0.66   |
| In-laws-owned x More                                     |             |          | —        |              |          | -0.21  |
| In-laws- owned x Equal                                   |             |          | —        |              |          | 0.15   |
| Control other variables                                  | Y           | Y        | Y        | Y            | Y        | Y      |
| BIC (covariates)   | 1762.4      | 1771.6   | 1775.8   | 1556         | 1560.2   | 1567.6 |
| Log-likelihood ratio test ( $\beta=0$ )                  | 504.3***    | 509.4*** | 505.3*** | 569.5***     | 579.4*** | 572*** |

**Notes:** (1) (A) The analysis excludes male participants living in the house of their in-laws, female participants living in in the house of their parents, and those who live in a matrilocal residence. (2) The value of the dependent variable is set as follows: 1 for “very satisfied”, 2 for “satisfied”, and 3 for “dissatisfied”; the odds ratio is calculated cumulatively from the smallest ordinal number. (3) Model type is PO (proportional odds model). (4) \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Furthermore, the regression results, which are the marital power models (D) (H), and marital satisfaction (S) models, indicate that housing tenure impacts marital satisfaction for both the men and women through the mediating effect of marital power.

## 5. Discussion and Conclusion

This study explores the impact of housing tenure on marital power and satisfaction, with a focus on gender differences. The findings indicate that housing tenure significantly influences marital power, particularly in family decision-making. Non-spousal-owned housing reduces the power of both genders in family decision-making, except for men in "parent-owned" housing who have more power. The female respondents in "parent-owned" housing have less power in decision-making compared to those in "in-laws-owned" housing. This suggests that the effect of parental resources on marital power is gender-specific and cannot be fully explained with the resource theory. The effect of "landlord-owned" housing differs between men and women, with male respondents having the least power in decision-making. This emphasizes the crucial role of housing ownership for husbands in consolidating their family status (Madigan et al., 1990; Fincher, 2016), whether the housing is provided by the husbands themselves or their parents.

The household responsibility hypothesis suggests that housework division is highly gender-specific. However, living in "parent-owned" housing can reduce the burden of housework for wives. Among the male respondents, living in "self-owned" housing increases their involvement in housework compared to those living in "landlord-owned" housing. This could be due to the increased contribution from the wife's income to household finances. The analysis of the correlation between housing tenure and income differences between spouses (Table 2) reveals that among those in "landlord-owned" housing, over 80% of the male respondents have an income equal to or more than that of their spouse, while this is only 67% for those in "self-owned" housing. These findings suggest that the resource theory alone cannot fully explain for the effect of non-spousal-owned housing on marital power, and the differential impact between spouses should consider gender roles.

This study examines the impact of housing tenure on the relationship between family structure and marital power. The findings indicate that housing tenure significantly affects the power of the male respondents with matrilineal residence in family decision-making, thus amplifying the effect of housing tenure on decision-making power. However, this moderating effect is not significant when male respondents with matrilineal residence are excluded. In contrast, the marital power of the female respondents is significantly influenced by both the family structure and housing tenure. Female respondents with "in-laws-owned" housing and patrilineal residence have less power in family

decision-making but more power in the division of housework. This suggests that the patriarchal culture and resources provided by parents of the husband can significantly reduce the power of a wife in family decision-making.

The correlation analysis (Table 2) indicates that wives in "in-laws-owned" housing comprise the lowest proportion of those with more power in division of housework (5%), but the largest proportion of those with equal division of housework (around 30%). This is likely because approximately 70% of the female respondents in "in-laws-owned" housing live in a "patrilocal residence" family structure, where housework may be shifted to their parents-in-law, thus resulting in a more balanced distribution of household responsibilities. This arrangement may serve as a coping strategy for employed women to manage their dual roles and responsibilities both inside and outside the home (Yu and Xie, 2018). As suggested by Cheng and Hahn (2014), wives in three-generation cohabitation arrangements may have higher employment.

In summary, housing tenure interacts with the family structure to reinforce the effect of normative resources on marital power. The impact of housing tenure on marital power is influenced by the provision of household resources (non-economic resources) from the parents. However, the moderating effect of housing tenure may primarily apply to the marital power of the wife, as matrilocal residence is rare in Taiwan. These findings explain why wives attach importance to housing in their marital life.

This study also examines the impact of housing tenure on marital satisfaction and its moderating effect on the relationship between marital power and family structure. The findings suggest that housing tenure plays a moderating role in the association between family decision-making power and marital satisfaction. The male respondents who are living in "self-owned" housing or have more power in family decision-making reported higher levels of marital satisfaction. However, when housing resources are provided by the husband's parents, the marital satisfaction outcomes are different compared to those with more power in family decision-making power and reside in "self-owned" housing.

The findings suggest that when housing is landlord-owned and there is equal decision-making power, the ability of wives to have equality in decision-making is realized. This implies that when neither spouse lives in the house that their parents own, the women have the opportunity to break free from traditional patriarchal norms associated with patriarchal residence and the power dynamics influenced by parental housing resources. This is likely due to the reduced gender-based division of housework in the context of labor market bifurcation and economic uncertainty (Cherlin, 2014). Younger women, who have higher levels of education and an advantage in the labor market, are more likely to have more bargaining power in marital power dynamics, thus leading to greater inclination towards egalitarian spousal relationships.

Lastly, this study further emphasizes the significance of housing tenure in marital life by finding that housing tenure influences marital satisfaction through its impact on marital power. In Taiwan, the "renting instead of buying" housing policy may erode the power of husbands in family decision-making and increase their power in division of housework, potentially reducing marital satisfaction. However, the marital power of wives in "landlord-owned" housing remains unaffected. To enhance marital satisfaction, these wives may need to actively develop equal power capabilities, such as making economic contributions to the household. Additionally, macroeconomic conditions, including housing market uncertainty and labor market changes, may indirectly or passively contribute to the ability of the wives to acquire equal power capabilities, further enhancing their marital power and positively impacting marital satisfaction.

The study focus on the significance of housing in marriage, particularly for women in Taiwan. This study goes beyond previous research on the correlation between marriage and housing purchase decisions. It shows that housing tenure not only directly affects marital power but also moderates the relationship between family structure and marital power, as well as the relationship between marital power and marital satisfaction. The gender-specific effects cannot be fully explained by the resource theory alone but require consideration of gender and cultural context. The role of housing in marital life differs between the genders, as does its impact on marital satisfaction through marital power.

The direct effect of housing tenure on marital power reveals that housing in marital life encompasses not only living space but also patriarchal family systems, patrilocal cohabitation, and intergenerational resource flow in Chinese-style marriages, all of which impact marital power.

Moreover, gender-specific housing effects are observed in the interaction between housing tenure and family structure. Females in patrilocal residence have little power in the division of housework, while those in patrilocal residence with "landlord-owned" housing show more power in division of housework. Housing tenure and family structure jointly influence the marital power of the female respondents and even change the direct effect of family structure on marital power. This may explain why women prefer house ownership, as it can change the dynamics of marital power within the context of patrilocal residence. The power of the male respondents in division of housework shows no significant interactive effect on family structure.

Lastly, the study reveals gender differences in housing expectations and their impact on marital satisfaction. Men perceive homeownership as a means to reinforce their gender status, while women see it as a fulfillment of their preference for equality. However, "parent-owned" housing strengthens the power of men in decision-making but reduces their marital satisfaction, which indicates a conflict between parental resources and the desire of men for gender consolidation through homeownership by themselves. Men face pressure to

conform to societal expectations of their gender role in marriage and housing purchase. This pressure, combined with the overshadowing effect of parental resources on their marital power, can negatively impact their marital satisfaction. This means that conforming to societal gender expectations through "doing gender" can create pressure (McKee et al., 2017), which leads to delays in achieving an equal division of labor and housework between spouses (García-Román, 2023), ultimately affecting marital satisfaction. Embracing non-traditional gender attitudes has been shown to contribute to marital happiness (Li et al., 2020). Additionally, the greater inclination of women towards gender equality (Yoo, 2022) and preference for more egalitarian intergenerational kinship (Choi et al., 2019) contribute to their desire for equal power in marriage. Patrilocal residence and housing provided by the husband's parents often reduce the marital power of women. Therefore, the preference of younger women for equal power is more likely to be fulfilled when housing is not owned by the in-laws. This mindset of housing being essential for marriage is one reason behind their preference.

In terms of research limitations, it is not possible to determine whether the spouses own their house individually or jointly due to the constraints of the family survey data, which limit the discussion of interspousal power. Additionally, obtaining the pairing data of the spouses posed challenges, which prevented the observation of differences in perceptions between husbands and wives regarding the combination of living arrangements and housing tenure. Nonetheless, the authors have made every effort to describe the power dynamics with the available data.

In Chinese families, married adult children are still economically intertwined with their family of origin through living arrangements and housing tenure, and form a complex ecological system within the power used between generations and spouses. Future research should compare high housing prices and an emphasis on home ownership between China and other nations, study the relationship between housing tenure, marital power, and marital satisfaction, and discuss the power differences in family ecological systems.

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