{"id":463,"date":"2020-04-27T20:32:31","date_gmt":"2020-04-27T12:32:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost:8888\/?p=463"},"modified":"2025-12-24T20:15:46","modified_gmt":"2025-12-24T12:15:46","slug":"re-default-risk-of-modified-mortgages","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/2020\/04\/27\/re-default-risk-of-modified-mortgages\/","title":{"rendered":"Re-Default Risk of Modified Mortgages"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t<div data-elementor-type=\"wp-post\" data-elementor-id=\"463\" class=\"elementor elementor-463\" data-elementor-settings=\"[]\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-section-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-40e77638 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"40e77638\" data-element_type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-row\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-3221698c\" data-id=\"3221698c\" data-element_type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-63707748 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"63707748\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-text-editor elementor-clearfix\"><p><!-- Article Title --><\/p><div class=\"article_label\">Article<\/div><p class=\"article_title\">Re-Default Risk of Modified Mortgages<\/p><div><p class=\"title_label_large\">Author<\/p><p class=\"title_label_large\">Start Page \/ End Page<\/p><p class=\"title_label\">Volume<\/p><p class=\"title_label\">Issue Number<\/p><p class=\"title_label\">Year<\/p><p class=\"title_label_large\">Publication<\/p><\/div><div><p><!-- Author \/ StartEndPage \/ Volume \/ IssueNumber \/ Year \/ Publication --><\/p><p class=\"title_text_large\">Jian Chen, Jin Xiang, Tyler T. Yang<\/p><p class=\"title_text_large\">1 \/ 40<\/p><p class=\"title_text\">21<\/p><p class=\"title_text\">1<\/p><p class=\"title_text\">2018<\/p><p class=\"title_text_large\">International Real Estate Review<\/p><\/div><div class=\"empty\">\u00a0<\/div><p class=\"abstract_label\">Abstract<\/p><p><!-- Abstract Content --><br \/>During the recent housing recession and financial crisis, mortgage modification has been heavily promoted by the U.S. government as a way to stabilize the housing and the national banking systems. Numerous programs, such as the Home Owners Preserving Equity (HOPE), Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP), and Home Affordability Refinance Program (HARP), were introduced or enhanced to allow more aggressive modifications than traditionally observed prior to the crisis. Loan modification is believed to be a way to avoid foreclosure and to help borrowers keep their homes. However, the effectiveness of loan modification in preventing eventual foreclosure has not been quantified. In this paper, we use Federal Housing Administration (FHA) modified loans to analyze their re-default risk. We use loan-level data to trace the performance of loans with heavy modifications. We have three major empirical findings. First, the empirical model shows that modified loans tend to have much higher re-default risk than otherwise identical never-defaulted loans. Second, the re-default model shows that re-default hazard is less sensitive to traditional risk drivers, compared with non-modified loans. Third, the re-default risk declines initially with the magnitude of the payment reduction associated with the modification received. However, as the payment reduction becomes substantial, the probability of re-default increases. Our empirical results suggest payment reduction is most effective around the 10% to 30% level, in order to reduce re-default risk. The effect is relatively flat between the 30% to 40% level. Payment reduction beyond the 40% level increases re-default risk, controlling for all observable variables. These findings have profound implications in how lenders should design optimal modification policies.<br \/><br \/><!-- PDF DownloadLink --><\/p><p class=\"download\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/10\/v21n1-re-default-risk-of-modified-mortgages.pdf\"><strong>View PDF -https:\/\/doi.org\/10.53383\/100253<\/strong><\/a><\/p><div class=\"empty\">\u00a0<\/div><p class=\"abstract_label\">Keywords<\/p><p><!-- Keywords --><\/p><p class=\"keywords\">Residential Mortgage, Default Risk, Credit Risk<\/p><p><a class=\"backpage\">Back to Previous Page<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<div>\n<p class=\"title_label_large\">Author<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_label_large\">Start Page \/ End Page<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_label\">Volume<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_label\">Issue Number<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_label\">Year<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_label_large\">Publication<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<!-- Author \/ StartEndPage \/ Volume \/ IssueNumber \/ Year \/ Publication --><\/p>\n<p class=\"title_text_large\">Jian Chen, Jin Xiang, Tyler T. Yang<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_text_large\"> 1 \/ 40<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_text\">21<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_text\">2<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_text\">2018<\/p>\n<p class=\"title_text_large\">International Real Estate Review<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"abstract_label mt16\">Keywords<\/p>\n<p class=\"keywords\">Residential Mortgage, Default Risk, Credit Risk<\/p>\n<p class=\"downloadLine\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.um.edu.mo\/fba\/irer\/papers\/past\/vol210n1_pdf\/01.pdf\">Download Entire Article.<img src=\"https:\/\/i.ibb.co\/m8rCXNQ\/download-pdf-large.png\" alt=\"download-pdf-large\" border=\"0\"> <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"article-template.php","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[39,38],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/463"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=463"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/463\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4765,"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/463\/revisions\/4765"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=463"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=463"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.gssinst.org\/irer\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=463"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}